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We are working on borrowed time in 
the political space temporarily opened 
up by the reports of the various human 
rights missions [that have visited Sri 
Lanka] in the past year. 
--Colombo-based 
human rights worker, 1992 
Introduction 
Even a cursory glance at the history of 
refugees reveals a connection between 
mass violence and the creation of large 
refugee populations. However, the ex- 
perience of Sri Lanka underscores the 
need to disentangle the nature and impli- 
cations of this connection. In Sri Lanka, 
different communities have been af- 
fected and displaced in response to 
changes in the dynamics of violence: in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, mob vio- 
lence in the Hill Country forced thou- 
sands of Plantation Tamils to seek refuge 
in the Northern Province and in south- 
em India; from 1987 onwards, military 
offensives by the Indian Peace Keeping 
Force (IPKF) and later the Sri Lankan 
Army displaced Tamils from the North- 
em and Eastern provinces, many of 
whom found their way to India, Europe 
and North America. More recently, the 
tacticaluse of massacresby all combatant 
groups in the Eastern province gener- 
ated a stream of internally displaced 
Muslims as well as Tamils.2 The bottom 
line is that in a country with an estimated 
populationof 17.5 million, there are more 
than a million displaced people-the 
majority of whom are from the Tamil 
com~nunity.~ 
The starting point for developing an 
understanding of conflict in Sri Lanka 
must be the recognition that the major 
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groups are internally divided into politi- 
cally salient subgroups along a range of 
differentiating axes such as regional 
identification, religion, language, caste, 
political ideas and class. This approach 
standsin contrast to therepresentation of 
the conflict as the stark and violent con- 
frontation between the Tamils and the 
Sinhalese. This article rests on the belief 
that to make sense of the patterns of eth- 
nicviolence, it is necessary to delve more 
deeply than the interaction between war- 
ring ethnic groups; it is essential that the 
structure and dynamics within the 
groups in conflict assume a central posi- 
tion in analysis. It would appear that the 
intransigence, intensity and insolubility 
of some cases of violent ethnic conflict 
may be less a consequence of the polari- 
zation of groups than a function of the 
splintering and warring of factions 
within factions. 
The systematic examination of the 
impact of fluctuating violence on refugee 
flows in Sri Lanka and elsewhere has 
implications for the development of 
practical early warning capabilities con- 
cerning refugees and displaced persons. 
It also hasimplications for efforts toman- 
age and settle such conflicts. Drawing on 
recent fieldwork, this article attempts to 
contribute to this examination by pro- 
viding a current snapshot of the various 
Tamil groups in Sri Lanka in the context 
of changing patterns of violence. 
Intra-Group Divisions of the Tamil 
Community 
Our examination of the intra-group divi- 
sions of the Tamil community is made 
easier by a geographical correspondence 
to major social, political and economic 
differences between groups. Accord- 
ingly, we may identify the following 
prinapal subgroups: Colombo Tamils, 
Jaffna or Northern Tamils, East Coast 
Tamils and Plantation Tamils. Not sur- 
prisingly, within each of these groups 
there are further subdivisions and sys- 
tems of stratification and differentiation 
(for example, caste, economic and social 
class, and political allegiance). While rec- 
ognizing the political salience of each of 
these subsequent axes of differentiation, 
this article privileges geographical cat- 
egorization because in Sri Lanka, where 
one lives is central to the understanding 
of who one is. Or, as Jonathan Spencer 
puts it, "identity is a matter of belonging 
to place as much as having a hi~tory."~ 
This is particularly important in the con- 
text of the current discussion because the 
patterns of violence and displacement 
are fundamentally rooted in "where one 
lives." Thus, for example, in 1991 the US. 
Committee for Refugees reported that in 
the Northern and Eastern provinces one 
in five residents has been displaced by 
the violence. 
Members within these Tamil sub- 
groups recognize a status hierarchy that 
conditions intra-group relations: Co- 
lombo Tamils and Jaffna Tamils place 
themselves on top, East Coast Tamils are 
located in the middle and the Plantation 
Tamils are at the b ~ t t o m . ~  This division 
is further underscored by many East 
Coast Tamils' distrust of the economic 
domination by Jaffna Tamils6 It is ironic 
that while cultural differences and natu- 
ral antipathies between the East Coast 
Tamils and Jaffna Tamils once may have 
encouraged each to pursue a separate 
political agenda, the government's 
heavy-handed military actionsappearto 
have helped to push these two groups 
closer together. Similarly, this appears to 
have contributed to making the East 
Coast Tamils more receptive to the most 
powerful Tamil paramilitary, the Libera- 
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-de- 
spite the Jaffna Tamil complexion of the 
organization? 
The great social distance between the 
Plantation Tahils and the other Tamil 
communities is reflected by a project ini- 
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tiated in the 1970s by the late Bishop Leo 
Nanayakkara to educate Jaffna Tamils 
about of Plan- 
tation Tamils. He was struck by two ob- 
servations: 1) the Jaffna Tamils' lack of 
awareness concerning the conditions on 
the tea plantations; and 2) the low regard 
in which Plantation Tamils were held by 
Jaffna Tamils. This latter point is fre- 
quently reflected in the JaffnaTamils' use 
of "low Tamil" when addsessing Planta- 
tion Tamils. Unfortunately, political 
events eventually buried this project. 
For the purposes of this article, the 
anthropological details of such divisions 
and stratification are less important than 
the fad that they exist and are politically 
salient in conditioning tho behaviour of 
the members of these sub-groups. The 
remaining sections of the article will situ- 
ate the intra-group divisions more ex- 
plicitly in the context of violence and 
the displacement of people. 
Internecine Feuding 
The feuding among Tamil paramilitary 
groups is an especially bloody manifes- 
tation of one axis of division within the 
Tamil community? Feuding between 
the major Tamil paramilitaries 
(particularly the LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, 
and PLOTE)9 hasbeen a common feature 
of paramilitary politics since the creation 
of these groups in the late 1970s and early 
1980-t times even spilling into the 
streets of South India. Violence became 
especially vicious following the gradual 
IPKF withdrawal from the Northern and 
Eastern provinces in 1989. 
This created a power vacuum and 
providedthe structuralincentives for the 
paramilitaries to intensify their battle for 
territorial control of the traditional Tamil 
regions. The groups were also fighting to 
militarily win the right to represent the 
Tamil people in the eyes of both Tamil 
and Sinhalese constituencies. In the con- 
text of the current discussion, it shouldbe 
noted that the withdrawal of the IPKF 
and subsequent reassertion of LTTE ter- 
ritorial control in the north and east sent 
many EPRLF supporters and govern- 
ment collaborators (voluntary and 
nonvoluntary) fleeing LTTE retribu- 
tion.1° This was reflected in a surge of 
applications for refugee statusinCanada 
and elsewhere.ll 
To compete with the battle-hardened 
and militarily superior LTTE, the other 
Tamil paramilitaries have attempted to 
draw resources from the Sri Lankan and 
Indian governments. Indeed, all major 
Tamil paramilitaries (TELO, PLOTE and 
EPDP)l2 are now allied alongside the Sri 
Lankan military against the LTI'E. The 
paramilitary cleavages appear to have 
been adroitly harnessed by both the IPKF 
and the Sri Lankan Army to pit Tamils 
against Tamils. At times, the govern- 
ment'smanipulation of paramilitary ani- 
mosities has subsidized the violence in 
unexpected ways. For example, the un- 
successful impeachment proceedings 
against Resident kemadasa in Septem- 
ber 1991 produced well-founded allega- 
tions that he was responsible for 
providing the LTTE with arms and 
supplies for use against the IPKF and the 
India-backed Tamil National Army 
(TNA) in November 198913 (Incidentally, 
these same supplies are now being used 
by the LTTE against the Sri Lankan 
Army, East Coast Muslims, Tamil 
civilians, pro-government Tamil para- 
militaries and Sinhalese settlers in the 
North). It would appear that the presi- 
dent was attempting to capitalize on the 
divisions between the Tamil para- 
militaries in order to buttress his political 
position from challengers within the 
Sinhalese political arena. That is, covert 
support to the LTTE allowed him to 
circumvent the constraints of the 1987 
India-SriLanka Agreement in an attempt 
to push the IPKF off the island. If 
successful, Premadasa would have been 
able to defuse a serious challenge from 
opponents that coalesced around the is- 
sue of expelling the IPKF. Interestingly, 
despite Sinhalese heterogeneity, the 
Agreement succeeded in rallying and 
aligning a diverse range of groups: politi- 
cal parties led by the opposition SLFP (Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party), community 
groups, the media, academics, segments 
of the Buddhist clergy, and Sinhalese 
cultural and Buddhist patriotic organi- 
zations. Perhaps most dangerously, it 
provided a lightening rod to mobilize the 
discontent of the unemployed Sinhalese 
youth which was ultimately expressed 
in the Peoples' Liberation Front (JW) 
insurrection of 198889. 
Similarly, despite the alliance of the 
EPRLF and PLOTE with the Sri Lankan 
military, there are strong allegations that 
Colombo previously provided support 
to the LTTE for its feud against the pro- 
government Tamil paramilitaries.14 At 
one level of analysis, the feuding is 
rooted in intra-group power politics. But 
at another level, the feuding is exacer- 
bated by the rivalry between Colombo 
and Delhi. In the latter regional context, 
intra-group feuding assumes the fea- 
tures of a war by proxy-with Delhi 
backing the EPRLF and the TNA and 
Colombo backing (however counterin- 
tuitively) the LTTE. 
Source: Gamnnsent of Sri Lanka Census 1981 
Table 1: The Demographic Composition in Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka 
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Northern Province 
District Jaffna Mullaitivu Vavuniya Mannar 
Sinhalese 0.6 5.1 16.8 8.1 
Sri Lankan Tamil 95.3 76.0 56.9 50.6 
Indian Tamil 2.4 13.9 19.4 13.2 
Muslim 1.6 4.9 6.9 26.6 
Other 0.1 0.1 0.02 1.5 
Eastern Province 
Trincomalee Batticaloa Amparai 
33.6 3.2 37.6 
33.8 70.8 20.1 
5.6 1.2 0.4 
29.0 24.0 41.6 








This paramilitary feuding has impli- 
cations for both current and future pat- 
terns of conflict in the North and East. 
The Tamil paramilitary coalition against 
the LlTE is very clearly a coalition of 
convenience rather than commitment. It 
has been maintained by the organiza- 
tional glue provided by Delhi and 
Colombo and by the common under- 
standing among the militants that they 
are threatened by the LTI'E. If the LlTE 
threat is weakened or removed, the un- 
ravelling of the coalition will likely fol- 
low and the conveniently overlooked 
intra-paramilitary tensions and conflict 
will spill into more violent feudingin the 
North and the East-and perhaps even 
into the streets of Colombo since that is 
where pro-government Tamil para- 
militaries located theiroffices.15 The July 
1989 murder in Colombo of the leader of 
the democratically-elected Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF)--allegedly by 
the LTTE-may presage things to come. 
The fuelling of intra-group antago- 
nism by Colombo and Delhi for short- 
term, short-sighted political goals 
contributes to the brutalization of civil- 
ians in the North and East and will in- 
hibit (or at least complicate) movement 
towards accommodation in any effort to 
construct a postwar settlement. 
Tamil-Muslim Relations on the 
East Coast 
The sensitive demographic balance on 
the East Coast is a crucial difference 
between the Northern and Eastern 
provinces--a difference that has been 
reflected in the dynamics of violence and 
the displacement of persons. While the 
northern Tamils clearly constitute the 
majority group in the Northern Prov- 
ince, the demographic dominance of 
Tamils is far less secure in the Eastern 
Province where Muslims find them- 
selves pivotally placed in a precarious 
ethnic balance (see Table 1).16 There the 
Muslims can substantially help or hinder 
either ~ a m i l  or Sinhalese efforts to cap- 
ture political and military control. Con- 
sequently, they have been variously 
wooed and attacked by militaries and 
paramilitaries on all sides. 
Until recently, relations between East 
Coast Tamils and Muslims fluctuated 
between cooperation and conflict, de- 
pending on the political context. Because 
of the Muslims' strategic position in the 
demographic balance, they have tended 
to support whichever political or rnili- 
tary group seemed best able to secure or 
protect their interests, It should be em- 
phasized that despite a common lan- 
guage, the two groups are clearly 
separated on the basis of religion.l7Sur- 
prisingly, in the past there has been suf- 
ficient common ground to encourage a 
number of Muslims to join the LTTE.18 
This fad should not suggest that the East 
Coast Muslim and Tamil political 
projects are one and the same; but it does 
illustrate the variable and nuanced rela- 
tionship between the two groups. How- 
ever, since June 1990 the two 
communities are being violently sepa- 
rated as a result of the LTTE campaign to 
isolate Muslims out of the region. The 
motives underpinning the LTTE version 
of ethnic cleansing remain unclear. Nev- 
ertheless, in October 1990, the LTTE ban- 
ished all Muslims living in the northern 
districts of Mannar, Mullaitivu, 
Kilinochchi and Jaffna with the order to 
"leave or be killed." Some villages were 
given as little as two hours to quit their 
homes.19 A consequence of this strategic 
shift in relations between the LTTE and 
the Muslims is the massive exodus of 
Muslims from the East Coast. It is esti- 
mated that approximately 60,000 evicted 
Muslims from these northern districts 
fled south seeking refuge. In July 1991, it 
was estimated that 40,000 Muslims were 
living in some sixty camps in Puttalam 
District. The Muslim Refugee Rehabilita- 
tion Organization estimated that at that 
time there were more than 100,000 dis- 
placed Muslims in Sri Lanka?O By Sep- 
tember 1992, it was reported in The lsland 
International that some 150,000 Muslims 
were displaced from the North?' 
The Sri Lankan government has al- 
ways been aware that a coalition of Mus- 
lims and Tamils on the East Coast could 
effectively challenge Colombo's author- 
ity. Thus, the government has employed 
a two-pronged strategy to lessen this 
possibility. First, it has attempted to alter 
the demographiccomposition of the East 
Coast by increasing Sinhalese settlement 
in and control over traditional Tamil ar- 
eas. This socalled "West Bank scheme" 
envisions the resettlement of thousands 
of armedsinhalese settlers trainedinself- 
defence on government-owned land in 
this areaaZ2 By 1985, over 50,000 Sinhalese 
(ex-convicts, retired military personnel 
and- families displaced by the massive 
Mahavelli water project) were resettled 
on traditional Tamil land. Unable to af- 
fect the government's colonization 
policy, some Tamil paramilitaries re- 
sponded with terror andviolence against 
these settlements-including the whole- 
sale massacre of communities, such as 
the Dollar and Kent Farm massacres in 
1984. 
The second part of Colombo's strat- 
egy hasbeen to encourage the separation 
of Muslim and ~ a m i l  interests and iden- 
tities. Education policy was conveniently 
pressed into service to allow Muslim 
children to study in "Muslim schools" 
(until 1974), which helped to emphasize 
religious differences while de- 
emphasizing the shared Tamil language. 
The establishment and expansion of 
these schools, it must be emphasized, 
vitiates the principle of nonsectarian 
state education, which has been the de- 
clared policy of all governments since 
1960.~~ 
Schisms are appearing within the 
Muslim community. The SriLanka Mus- 
lim Congress (SLMC), the first explicitly 
Muslim political party, was created to 
represent Muslim interests. However, it 
has been hindered by the debate over 
who or what constitutes the "Muslim 
voice" and its subsequent poor showing 
in the May 1993 Provincial Council elec- 
tion suggests diversity rather than unity. 
Furthermore, young Muslims in Sinhala- 
speaking areas of the country are re- 
ported to be losing their ability to speak 
Tamil to their co-religionists on the East 
Coast, thus suggesting the beginnings of 
a linguistic as well as a regional divide 
among the Muslim ~omrnunity.~ 
Especially effective in separating 
Muslims and Tamils on the East Coast 
was the Sri Lankan government's deci- 
sion to create and arm a Muslim civilian 
militia (the Muslim Home Guard) osten- 
sibly for community protection. Mean- 
while, Tamil villages are unarmed and 
unprotected. As far as self-protection is 
- -- 
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concerned, the Muslim Home Guard 
appears niore likely to be involved in the 
massacre of innocent Tamil children, 
women and men than in the protection of 
Muslim communities. The consequence 
of this government policy has been the 
provision of the material means to 
militarily pit Muslim poups against 
Tamil groups. The victims, by and large, 
are the innocent civilians caught in the 
middle. This is graphically evident in the 
increasing use of massacres by all com- 
batant groups in Sri Lanka. 
The Tactical Use of Massacres 
The Welikande massacre of 162 people 
illustrates the dynamics of this type of 
violence. At the end of April 1992 in the 
Muslim village of Alinghipotana, the 
Muslim Home Guard fled into the jun- 
gles when the village was attacked by 
thirty to forty armed men who were be- 
lieved to be members of the LTTE. 
Twenty people were injured and seventy 
four people were murdered including 
five babies and twenty-eight school chil- 
dren; most were stabbed or hacked to 
death. A few hours later, the Muslim 
Home Guard left the jungle and teamed 
up with some Muslim policemen to 
launch its own massacre on the Tamil 
village of Muthugala. Fifty people were 
murdered and sixteen were injured. The 
slaughter continued in the Tamil village 
of Karapola-thirty-eight people were 
murdered including six children. Fifty- 
nine were injured.25 
This incident reflects an especially 
brutal violence on the East Coast; one 
that is likely to continue festering for a 
number of reasons. The location of such 
villages in the "interface" between the 
Tamil north and the Sinhalese south 
places them on the front line in the battle 
for control of both territory and the 
"hearts and minds" of villagers. The dis- 
integration of the rule of law in the coun- 
try as a whole, and the failure to hold 
combatants accountable for their actions 
in the war zone (reflected in the system- 
atic and pervasive human rights abuses 
by all forces) leave villagers open to con- 
tinued abuse andintimidation. The most 
likely reason for the continuation of such 
massacres is that both pro-government 
and LTTE forces appear to have adopted 
military strategies designed to pursue 
their battle for territorial and political 
control through intimidation and terror. 
Massacres have become part of the mili- 
tary repertoire for all combatant groups 
in the North and East.26 
It is impossible to ensure the security 
of thousands of villagers in the midst of 
ongoing war. As in Yugoslavia, civilians 
are not simply caught in the crossfire, 
they have become targets.27 Massacres 
are orchestrated to push people out of 
strategic areas and to create inter group 
enmity in order to inhibit the develop- 
ment of inter-group coalitions that might 
challenge the warring factions or the le- 
gitimacy of violence. While such atroci- 
ties may be instrumentally employed by 
group leaders, the barbarism is as much 
a consequence as a cause of the conflict. 
Even more prevalent than the massa- 
cres are widespread disappearances and 
increasing vigilantism. From June 1990 
to September 1991, on the East Coast, 
Amnesty International reported that 
over 3,000 Tamil people "disappeared 
while in the custody of government 
forces.28 By June 1992, the Missing Per- 
sons Project of the Batticaloa Peace Com- 
mittee had a growing list of 3,600 names 
for the Batticaloa area. Especially embar- 
rassing for the Premadasa regime are the 
recent allegations by Premadasa 
Udagampola, the former deputy inspec- 
tor of police, that the United National 
Party (UNP) government of Premadasa 
employed its own vigilante squad called 
the "Black Cats" to murder opponents, 
including members of the official oppo- 
sition party, the Sri Lankan Freedom 
Party.29 
Until there is a lasting political solu- 
tion, innocent villagers will continue to 
be brutalized, displaced and killed. Yet, 
even if a political solution was worked 
out, the most daunting obstacle to peace 
would be the traumatic legacies of dehu- 
manization and distrust.30 
The direct consequence of such vio- 
lence in the North and East has been the 
massive dislocation of thousands of 
Tamils and Muslims. Many internally 
displaced people have found themselves 
in and around Colombo. A pressing 
question for many outside observers and 
agencies concerns the safety of Tamils in 
C o l o m M o t h  newly arrived and per- 
manent residents. The following section 
addresses this question. 
The Situation of Tamils in 
Colombo 
Depending on who one talks to, the situ- 
ation for Tamils in Colombo ranges from 
"perfectly fine" to "dangerously un- 
safe." However, those who work with 
refugees tend to argue that Colombo is 
not a safe haven for displaced Tamils or 
an "internal flight alternative." The offi- 
cial number of Tamil refugees in Co- 
lombo is 11-12,000. But these numbers 
are considerably underestimated be- 
cause the government stopped register- 
ing displaced peoples in November 1990. 
One human rights worker estimated that 
there were between 16-17,000 displaced 
Tamils in camps around Colombo, with 
the average camp holding 600-1000 in- 
mates. In three camps visited by the U.S. 
Committee for Refugees in May 1991,20- 
30 percent of the residents were unregis- 
tered. The impact of non-registration of 
persons both outside andinside campsis 
twofold: it makes it difficult to calculate 
the number of people displaced by the 
war, and those who are not officiallyreg- 
istered by the government are not enti- 
tled to food rations. 
The Tamil camps in Colombo consist 
primarily of East Coast Tamils.31 One 
human rights worker explained that this 
is "because Jaffna Tamils, by and large, 
always seem to have an out." They have 
the international contacts and linkages 
that seem to enable them to leave the 
country. This observation should not be 
taken to imply that those groups with 
access to international networks are not 
legitimate refugees. But, it does point to 
a particular catch-22 of the refugee deter- 
mination process: those individuals who 
might most legitimately and accurately 
be identified as refugees, according to 
even the most stringent definition, may 
be those who are least able to petition for 
refugee status. Further discussion of the 
situation of displaced Tamils in camps 
around Colombo lends support to this 
suggestion. 
Although the displaced persons 
camps are the responsibility of govern- 
ment authorities (such as the Ministry of 
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Social Services and the Ministry of Reha- 
bilitation and Reconstruction), the 
help of a pro-government Tamil para- 
military, the EPDP, has been harnessed 
to administer and police the camps. By 
allaccounts,the EPDPmaintains oppres- 
sively tight control within the camps. It 
suppresses all "political talk" and has 
been known to kidnap and murder indi- 
viduals to enforce its control. In a recent 
case, a Colombo-based human rights 
group was actively involved in negotiat- 
ing the release of a boy who was kidn 
pped from a camp by the EPDP. The 
oy eventually reappeared on the East 
Coast in Batticaloa, an area where the 
EPDP is militarily active. Despite the 
successful retrieval of the boy, he was 
described as having been "hollowed 
out" psychologically, emotionally and 
spiritually as a result of torture?= It 
would appear that intimidation and ter- 
ror is a central element of EPDP control in 
the camp. As well as restricting activities 
within the camp, the EPDP also restricts 
the movement of people out of the camp 
by imposing an inhibitive bureaucratic 
process. Only recently has the role of the 
EPDP in the security network attracted 
public notice when it was reported that 
the inspector general of police stated that 
he had no control over the EPDP.33 
It is interesting to note that displaced 
Tamil women are allowed somewhat 
easier access to the few activities avail- 
able on the outside (such as training in 
"traditional women's skills" like sewing 
and typing). This is because prevailing 
cultural attitudes do not immediately 
cast women-even Tamil women-as a 
potential political threat. Unfortunately, 
for both economic and security reasons, 
these newly acquired skills are not gen- 
erally put to use outside of the camp. The 
economic disincentive is that even if 
camp Tamilsmanaged to secure employ- 
ment on the outside, the EPDP levies a 
very hqvy " tax" on the earnings (as high 
as 50 percent).34 
The security disincentives for not 
venturing from the camps are even more 
constraining. During the height of the 
second JVP insurrection (1987-90) all ur- 
ban residents in Sri Lanka had to register 
at the local police stations in their neigh- 
bourhoods. There was a tight network to 
enforce this control. For example, land- 
lords were responsible for ensuring that 
all tenants were registered at the police 
station (this required character state- 
ments from the police station in the 
hometowns of the tenants-obviously, a 
difficult requirement for those fleeing 
violence). While this government direc- 
tive has recently lapsed, it has been refor- 
mulated to apply only to landlords in 
Colombo who want to keep Tamil ten- 
ants from the North or the East?5 Fur- 
thermore, anonymous phone calls and 
letters frequently draw the authorities' 
attention to "visitors" and strangers from 
outside. This is one form of control that 
discourages displaced persons from 
straying from the camp. 
There are also frequent cordon and 
search round-ups in and around Co- 
lombo where there are even more prob- 
lems for those who are not where they 
are supposed to be.36 The frequency of 
the round-ups and detentions depends 
on triggering events (such as assassina- 
tions and explosions) and the general 
political climate. These round-ups affect 
both long-time residents and displaced 
Tamik3' Everyone is collected and de- 
tained under the Prevention of Terror- 
ism Act. One human rights worker 
estimated that the typical minimum de- 
tention is ninety days. And in jails, as one 
human rights worker explained, beat- 
ings are routine. Because everyone from 
an area is rounded up, there is often no 
one on the outside to exert external pres- 
sure for release. When an employee for a 
Colombo-based human rights organiza- 
tion was rounded up and detained, it 
took tens days to gain release-and that 
was the result of a concerted effort by a 
human rights group! The process is even 
more protracted for an intimidated ordi- 
nary citizen. The bureaucratic and politi- 
cal obstacles to gaining release are 
formidable and recent amendments to 
the emergency regulations have not sub- 
stantially improved the situation.% 
It isvery important to emphasize that 
those detained by government forces 
may be held in any place designated by 
the secretary to the Ministry of Defence 
and that the officers in charge are not 
required to inform magistrates or any- 
one else that they have in custody per- 
sons arrested under emergency reg&- 
tions. This has contributed to the mask- 
ing of human rights abu~es.3~ 
A Tamil in Colombo is at riskof being 
"detained not only by the official secu- 
rity forces but also by the pro-govern- 
ment Tamil paramilitaries. While the risk 
of being detained by the Tamil 
paramilitaries remains lower than that of 
being detained by the police and govem- 
ment forces, it remains a group-specific 
risk nonetheless and contributes to the 
sense of insecurity of Tamils in Colombo 
(as well as other parts of the island, par- 
ticularly Batticaloa and elsewhere on the 
East Coast). Although the pro-govem- 
ment Tamil paramilitaries have no legal 
authority to detain and arrest people in 
Colombo, it appears to be accepted by 
the authorities. As the leader of one pro- 
government Tamil paramilitary ex- 
plained, "Yes, of course this is illegal" but 
"it is common practice and accepted." 
The Tamils will not go to the police be- 
cause "they know what the next action 
will beM. . ~l We'll just shoot somebody, or 
somebody will be missed from their fam- 
ily." This was all explained as part of the 
commonplace daily activities within a 
system animated by "everybody [being] 
afraid of everybody." The Tamil 
paramilitaries claim to either "settle" the 
problem themselves or to deliver those 
they have abducted to the police. Thereis 
some informal cooperation and cwrdi- 
nation between the pro-government 
Tamil paramilitariesin the event that one 
group mistakenly arrests a member of 
another group. "Cordial" arrangements 
are made to release the detainee. Most 
noteworthy is how common and ac- 
cepted this type of activity is. This further 
suggests the disintegration of the rule of 
law and the prevalence of intimidation 
as a common form of social control. 
Thus the displaced Tamils in Co- 
lombo face a dead end at every turn: they 
are at risk in their home provinces; they 
are at risk in Colombo, and they are at 
riskin the camps. AlthoughcampTarnils 
appear to be a group at risk, there are few 
avenues open for them to get out. Osten- 
sibly, passports are available from local 
city halls (kachcheris), but in order to get a 
visa, one has to journey into Colombo. 
Yet the group-specific restrictions noted 
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earlier penalizes Tamils from all sub- 
groups and further puts them at risk. 
Thus, they are often afraid to come to 
Colombo and are unable to stay the 
amount of time that it takes to get a visa; 
another door is closed. 
Plantation Tamils 
Like other groups of Tamils, the Planta- 
tion Tamils have been displaced by suc- 
cessive waves of communal violence. 
The postelection riots in 1977, as well as 
the violence against the Plantation 
Tamils in 1980 and 1981, sent many seek- 
ing refuge in Vavuniya and other north- 
em districts. A number of Sri Lankan 
observers reported that this helped' to 
facilitate tentative contact between Plan- 
tation Tamil youths and some of the 
Tamil paramilitaries, such as PLOTE and 
ERO-ontact that has not yet resulted 
in any type of concerted action or coop- 
eration. It was not until the 1983 violence 
that displaced Plantation Tamils began 
seeking refuge in South India from the 
violence. It has been estimated that in 
1983, two-thirds (approximately 20,000) 
of those Tamils who sought refuge in 
Tamil Nadu were Plantation Tamils 
from the Kandy and Nuwara Eliya re- 
gions.* It is important to note that the 
violence that has displaced Plantation 
Tamils has been that of rioting mobs 
rather than that of Tamil paramilitaries 
and government forces. Thus in recent 
years this group has not suffered the 
same type of dislocation as those in the 
North and the East. Political powerless- 
ness and social and geographical separa- 
tion from other Tamil groups have 
tended to cast Plantation Tamils into the 
political backwater. However, changes 
within that community may soon in- 
crease politicization and volatility. 
Changes within the Plantation Tamil 
community that are altering the politics 
of identity include increasing literacy, 
education and politicalawareness. These 
changes are reflected in the shifting po- 
litical demands of Plantation Tamils 
from issues of atizenship and labour to 
issues of political representation and 
governance. The emergence of a Planta- 
tion Tamil political movement called the 
Up Country Peoples' Front (UCPF), led 
by the now imprisoned P. Chandra- 
sekaran, is a recent development that 
presages political mobilization. The sig- 
nificance of the UCPF lies less in the or- 
ganization per se than in the internal 
social changes noted earlier that have 
made this development possible. As one 
researcher noted, "in the course of my 
research, I have met ten Chandra- 
sekarans." One community worker pre- 
dicted that it will be the next generation 
of Plantation Tamil youths-those who 
are educated and unemployed-that 
will be the basis of the politicization of 
the Plantation Tamils interests. 
In the mid-to late 1980s there were 
tentative efforts by Northern Tamil mili- 
tant groups to enlist Plantation Tamil 
youths into the broader Eelam struggle. 
Indeed, Chandresekaran contested the 
1989 elections under the PLOTE banner. 
Such contacts have been relatively lim- 
ited and results have been minimal. 
Nonetheless, the government's fear of 
such infiltration has recently led to mass 
arrests of Plantation Tamils by police in 
the Hill C~untry.~l The hitherto failure of 
Northern militant efforts to expand the 
Eelam struggle into the plantation areas 
suggests the fundamental social tension 
between the Northern Tamil and Planta- 
tion Tamil political projects. Ironically, 
the more severe the crackdown on the 
alleged political activities of the Planta- 
tion Tamils, the more likely it maybe that 
they will respond to Northern Militant 
overtures. Indeed, despite the apparent 
incongruity of the arrangement, a 
number of Plantation Tamils teamed up 
with the Marxist Sinhalese JVP during 
the terror of the 1987-89 insurrection. 
Clearly, political convenience may go a 
considerable distance towards blending 
the ostensibly incompatible." 
Many of the "new" political voices 
among the Plantation Tamils arise from 
the disgruntlement with the inability of 
the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), 
the largest Plantation Tamil trade union, 
to "deliver the goods." In the past, politi- 
cal dissent and demands could be paci- 
fied or defused by the adroit 
manoeuvring of the leader, UNP Minis- 
ter S. Thondaman, whichincluded crack- 
ing down on opposing unions as well as 
delivering significant political gains on 
paper, such as citizenship for those Plan- 
tation Tamils who were disenfranchised 
after independence. However, the ad- 
vanced age of Mr. Thondaman (now 
eighty-one years old) has given rise to 
jostling for leadership within the CWC. 
His eventual death will set in motion a 
battle for succession and will remove an 
element of stability within the Plantation 
Tamil areas. At this stage, a struggle for 
political control will likely take place 
both within the CWC and among the 
political groups in the Hill Country. This 
struggle need not necessarily be violent, 
and it need not attract the mobilized vio- 
lence of Sinhalese chauvinists, but the 
destabilization will provide convenient 
points of access for those with political 
scores to settle. 
Conclusion 
The situation is potentially dangerous 
for all Tamil groups in Sri Lanka. Tamils 
in the North and East are increasingly 
subjected to systematic abuses by all 
combatant groups. As one former rnili- 
tary officer put it, such atrocities are 
justified by "the necessity of author- 
itarianism in the face of crisis." A similar 
sentiment is reflected in the statement by 
a highly placed government official: 
"any solution must begin with the total 
military annihilation of the LTTE." Fur- 
ther, those Tamils and Muslims who 
have already been displaced by the vio- 
lence are still in potential danger. Those 
in camps are still subject to abuse. As for 
the plantation areas, political rumblings 
suggest that the flare-up in labour vio- 
lence is a real possibility in the wake of 
the inevitable exit of Thondaman who 
has provided a degree of stability 
through his leadership of the Ceylon 
Workers Congress. 
While the focus of this article on the 
Tamil community is in keeping with the 
theme of this issue, a complete under- 
standing of the conflict clearly requires 
the incorporation of the Sinhalese com- 
munity into theintragroup level of analy- 
sis. The recent assassinations of President 
Premadasa and his political rival, Lalith 
Athulathmudali, only underscore the 
need to examine the impact of Sinhalese 
intra-group politics on inter-group con- 
flict. The immediate future of Sinhalese- 
Tamil relations will be indelibly affected 
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by the outcome of power struggles cur- 
rently taking place within the Sinhalese 
arena. There is a looming danger that the 
jostling for position in Colombo may 
encourage some political entrepreneurs 
to play the chauvinist card (i.e., encour- 
age anti-Tamil sentiment) inorder to con- 
solidate internal support. While the 
absence of anti-Tamil riots in the wake of 
Premadasa's assassination was wel- 
comed with relief by all observers, there 
remains considerable uncertainty as to 
the way in which the new president, D.B. 
Wijetunge, and his prime minister, Rani1 
Wickremasinghe, will choose to address 
Tamil grievances and the festering vio- 
lence in the North and the East. A host of 
factors adds to the uncertainty. The lead- 
ing political parties are riven with com- 
peting factions. While the leaders of the 
JVP have been killed, the root causes that 
precipitated the insurrections of 1971 
and 1987 remain unaddressed (espe- 
cially youth unemployment and politi- 
cal disillusionment). And particularly 
ominous in the midst of this political tur- 
moil is the issue of the future role of the 
military in Sri Lankan politics; its leader- 
ship has been decimated by assassina- 
tions and the loyalty of its troops is open 
to question.* 
The immediate future does not look 
especially promising. Yet, Iwillconclude 
somewhat optimistically with a passage 
from a story told to me by a community 
worker in a war-tom area: 
After the spray of machine gun-fire, 
the ragged and pock-marked wall was 
left unplastered for about a year. Dur- 
ing that time a small sparrow decided 
to make one of the bullet holes its 
home. It pecked and picked the loose 
plasteraway, eventually dislodged the 
slug and made a tiny nest (Fieldnotes 
from Batticaloa, June 1992). 
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